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Required: An Administrative Procedure Act
For Ontario
ARNOLD ENGLANDER and GORDON MARANTZ *
The courts of law, with centuries of experience behind them, have worked
out principles of procedure which everyone recognizes as being right and
fair. Tribunals, and more particularly enquiries, have no general code of
procedure, and it is mainly for this reason that there is dissatisfaction
with them.1
With the ever increasing proliferation of tribunals within the
structure of modern government this cry has been echoed many
times. Further, with this increase in number has come the recogni-
tion of their expanding importance and necessity in the complex
structure of government life. In order to function efficiently there
is a need for the actions of these tribunals to be brought within the
realm of public confidence.
There is a current body of opinion that feels the best suited
remedy for this dissatisfaction lies in extended employment of judicial
review and appeals to the courts. Others, the authors of this article
among them, believe that:
what is required is not opportunities for appeals, so much as opportu-
nities for full consideration of all the relevant facts . . .2
In other words any attempt to improve the administrative picture
should begin with an attack on the deficiencies in administrative
procedure which give rise to the need for correction. To this end this
article will advocate an administrative procedure act for Ontario.
A submission of this sort has been dealt with recently 'in the
report of the Gordon Committee:
Suggestions were made to us that there should be a statutory code of
procedure which would apply to all government agencies rendering
administrative, judicial or quasi-judicial decisions, or that a minimum
code be set up for such agencies. We have been impressed with the
difficulty of classifying functions by the multiplicity of purposes that trial
agencies serve. In view of this we do not believe that a single code of
procedure could be drafted that would be workable in practice; a mini-
mum code for general application would fall far short of requirements In
some cases.3
Messrs. Englander and Marantz are in the third year at Osgoode Hall
Law School.
1H.W.R. Wade, Submissions, Minutes of Evidence taken before the
Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Inquiries, H.M. Stationery
Office, 1956, p. 547-8.
2 Denys Munby, The Procedure of Public Inquiries, (1956), 34 Pub. Ad.
175 at p. 184.
3 Report of The Committee on The Organization of Government in Ont-
ario, W.L. Gordon, Chairman, September 1959, at p. 28.
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Yet the Committee's report does not entirely negate the desire
for uniform administrative procedure. Rather, in the next paragraph,
they suggest that each agency or board pass its own code of proce-
dure, with a view to having the codes as uniform as possible.4 What
the Committee fails to recognize or consider is that it is possible to
have a general code of procedure flexible enough to adapt itself to
the divergent purposes of each tribunal.
The whole idea is to have a skeleton, on which administrative
agencies may adopt their own rules of procedure.5
The Gordon Committee has not been the sole body apprehensive
of the workability of a general code of procedure. The Report of the
Franks Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries, in
the United Kingdom6 contains similar misgivings:
We agree that procedure is of the greatest importance and that it
should be clearly laid down in a statute or statutory instrument. Because
of the great variety of the purposes for which tribunals are established,
however, we do not think it would be appropriate to rely upon either a
single code or a small number of codes. We think that there is a case
for greater procedural differentiation and prefer that the detailed pro-
cedure for each type of tribunal should be designed to meet its particular
circumstances.7
It appears therefore that the Franks Committee wished each tri-
bunal to be master of its own procedure, in preference to either a
general act governing tribunals or several acts applying to related
groups of tribunals. At this stage the Committee dismisses a detailed
code but overlooks the benefits to be attained from the general "skele-
ton type" act, which leaves the tribunal free to promulgate its own
appropriate detailed rules.
However, the Franks Committee, at a later stage in the Report,
shifts ground by recommending that a standard code or codes of
procedure be published in statutory form and made available to the
parties.8 It is difficult to reconcile these comments.
As a result of the recommendation of the Franks Committee,
the Tribunals and Inquiries Act, 19589 was enacted. This Act set up
a Council on Tribunals to oversee the general operations of tribunals.
In relation to procedure, no tribunal may make rules except after
4 "Subordinate agencies should be empowered to establish, and should
establish, rules of practice and procedure. We suggest, too, that it should
be the general objective that the codes be as uniform as possible, setting
out such fundamentals as adequate notice to interested parties; full parti-
culars of the case that has to be met; the right to inspect, before the hearing,
reports or other documents that are to be received as evidence and the right
to be represented by counsel. It would seem desirable that these codes be
subject to review . . . in order that they may be made as uniform and
complete as possible."
5 Wily, Improvements in Agency Procedure, (1948), 34 A.B.A.J. 877 at
p. 878.
6 Report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries,
Cmd. 218, July, 1957.
7mbid, para. 63.
8sbid, para. 310.
9 6 and 7 Eliz. 2, c. 66.
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consultation with the council.'0 This conceivably will achieve some
uniformity in rule making among the tribunals.
More advanced measures have been taken with success in the
United States.
The American Federal Administrative Procedure Act" (com-
monly called the A.P.A.) passed in 1946, is a statement of the basic
procedural principles which are to govern the administrative process.
The Act states the essentials of proper administrative practice, and
statutory forms and imposes the best existing procedure on the
administration as a whole.' 2 These basic principles include provisions
for notice, separation of the adjudicatory and prosecutory functions,
rules of evidence, the right to cross examine, the right to counsel,
the necessity that decisions be based on facts proved during a hearing,
and reasons for these decisions. It is far from a comprehensive code
of fair administrative procedure. It is a general framework rather
than a detailed code. The Act thus imposes the best pre-1946 pro-
cedure upon all Federal departments and agencies.
The value of a statute can only be demonstrated by results. Nine
years after the passage of the A.P.A. the Task Force of the Hoover
Commission13 reported that experience had demonstrated the value
of the A.P.A. in protecting the public interest and private rights.
Professor B. Schwartz commented that:
though many of the administrative agencies themselves strenuosuly
opposed the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act, opposition
to that law has now all but disappeared. Indeed, in the ten years that
have elapsed since the enactment of the 1946 Act, the basic principles
behind it have obtained well nigh universal acceptance among students
of administrative law, even from those who had formerly opposed such
legislation.' 4
It is not American opinion alone that subscribes to the value of
an administrative procedure act. A comparatively recent English
study reached the same conclusion.15
The Hoover Commission Report did not limit itself to a con-
sideration of the status quo, but felt the Act was now accepted as
so elementary and fundamental that the time had arrived for its
strengthening and expansion. They advocated a more detailed pre-
scription of administrative procedures.
0lIbid, s. 8(1).
160 Stat. 241 (1946); 5 U.S.C. c. 19 (1958).
12 B. Schwartz, Submissions, Minutes of Evidence, supra, footnote 1, p.
1008; for comment on this see (1957), 35 Can. Bar Rev. 743 at p. 747.
13 Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Govern-
ment, Herbert Hoover, Chairman; 1955 Report.14 B. Schwartz supra, footnote 12, Evidence p. 1013; (1957), 35 Can. Bar
Rev. p. 755-6.
15A study of the Inns of Court Conservative and Unionist Society, Rule
of Law (1955), p. 26; the provisions of the American Act "are designed to
rectify similar abuses and shortcomings to those which we have seen in our
own administrative procedure; and they have additional value for us as
being enacted within a society with similar traditions and problems to our
own and in the context of a system of law of common origin."
[VOL. 2:76
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All this was accomplished in a complex, expensive federal juris-
diction, containing a large number of varied agencies with divergent
functions. Even further, a number of American states have passed
their own administrative procedure acts based on the Model State
Administrative Act. The Model Act, in the manner of its predecessor,
the Federal Act, constitutes a general framework of the essentials of
fair adjudicatory procedure. The detailed application of the principle
is left to the agencies concerned, Yet in face of all these efforts in
the United States, and perhaps in ignorance of them, the Gordon
Committee blandly assumes that this success cannot be duplicated
in Ontario.
Uniform administrative procedure is required in Ontario to
provide a general standard for tribunals to adhere to. The most
effective means to accomplish this object is through the medium of
an act to guarantee fairness to individuals. The areas presently open
to abuse will become self-evident later in this essay where the
specific topics to be encompassed by an act are dealt with.
Any proposed act should be devoted mainly to those requisites
of a hearing that ensure fair treatment of the individual before the
tribunal. These include among others, notice of the case which the
party has to meet, the requirement that decisions be reasoned and
based on facts proved during the hearing, and the rights to counsel
and cross-examination.
We have not attempted to draft an act, but rather, we have made
general recommendations as to the desired contents of an administra-
tive procedure act. Many of the requirements we have included are
standard administrative practice in Ontario. Therefore, there is no
reason why they should not be entrenched by means of a legislative
enactment.
In addition, we extend the scope of this article to include a
recommendation which had its origin in the American A.P.A. Every
government agency or department empowered to make rules or
regulations governing the general public should be obliged to give
notice of its intention to that portion of the public affected by its
regulations. This provision, we submit, should similarly apply to all
agencies of government in Ontario, irrespective of whether the
particular tribunal, board, agency, department or commission is or
is not required to hold a hearing.
The Scope of the Proposed Act
We do not believe that such an act should specifically enumerate
the tribunals, boards or commissions compelled to comply with it.
Rather, the act should apply generally to those tribunals, which are
by Zaw, required to hold a hearing.16 Thus the act would not make
16 This introduces the concept of natural justice, which contains two
principles. The first is that the adjudicator shall not be biased. The second
principle, known as the audi alteram partem rule, provides that a tribunal
should not make a decision affecting the personal or proprietary rights
of a party without giving that party an opportunity to present his case.
Thus, if a statute authorizes an agency to adjudicate on these rights without
specifically providing a hearing for the individual, the courts usually require
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any contribution to the law concerning the right of a hearing.
Although the principle of audi alteram partem, is beyond dispute, the
difficulty rests in its application. There are two ways to deal with
the problem, The legislature may prescribe from case to case when
a hearing must be held, or the courts may, in the absence of statutory
direction, state in a given case whether a hearing should be held.
The provision that the act apply to those tribunals "required
by law to hold a hearing" assigns to the courts the function of decid-
ing when a hearing should be held. In the absence of a tribunal's
enabling statute providing for a hearing, the enforcement of the
audi .alteram partem principle rests with the courts. A statute on
administrative procedure should not be concerned with the unintel-
ligible distinctions between judicial and administrative functions. This
matter is reserved for the consideration of the courts in deciding
whether a hearing should be held or not; once a decision is reached
in the affirmative, the supervisory provisions of the act prevails
throughout.
Enforcement of the Act
Before formulating any proposals for an act, one must remember
that at best it would only be a framework of general principles in
the manner of the American Act, and as such it anticipates that each
tribunal, while conforming to the act, will prescribe its own detailed
rules of procedure. These details will cover such matters as the
filing of papers, computation of time, the form and style of docu-
ments, and the rudiments of prehearing procedure. In our view it is
desirable that tribunals exercising comparable functions should pro-
duce practice rules similar in character.
To ensure this end, and to ensure that the principles of the act
are carried out, an officer or agency to administer the act is required.
The Hoover Commission Task Force made recommendations of this
sort. In England, a similar result was achieved via the establishment
of the Council on Tribunals under the Tribunals and Inquiries Act.
The Council on Tribunals, among other things, exists to "keep
under review the constitution and working of the tribunals.., and,
from time to time to report on their constitution and working." Even
the agency to grant a hearing; if it does not grant a hearing its declsion
will be quashed as contrary to national justice. The A.P.A. applies
"in every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined
on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.. ." See s. 5 A.P.A.,
5 U.S.C. c. 19, s. 1004, 1958 Code. This provision has sometimes been inter-
preted by the courts to include agencies whose enabling statute does
not expressly require a hearing. In Wong Yang Sung 'v. McGrath, 339 U.S.
33 (1949), the United States Supreme Court held that the provisions of
the A.P.A. applied in those instances where the requirement of a hearing
had to be read into the agency statute by the court. The court was of the
opinion that an alien had a right to a hearing before a deportation order
could be made against him, although the Immigration Act had no such
proviso. Once the right to a hearing was read into the statute, the A.P.A.
applied. This decision was followed by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Riss and Company Inc. v. United States, 71 Sup. Ct. 620 (1951).
For the approach in the British Commonwealth, as to when a hearing is
required, see de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (London,
Stevens and Sons Ltd., 1959), chapter 4.
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more broad is the Council's power to consider and report on such
particular matters as may be referred to it, or as the Council may
determine to be of special importance, with respect to administrative
procedures, whether or not they involve the holding of a hearing.
This Council is appointed by the Lord Chancellor and is respon-
sible to Parliament through his office.
Also in line with the general policy considerations behind the
A.P.A. were the Hoover Commission recommendations for some type
of continuous supervision over administrative bodies. Something
more than the sporadic commissions and inquiries which come up
from time to time was needed. The 1941 Attorney General's Com-
mittee17 recommended the creation of an agency to improve adminis-
trative procedures by continuous study and supervision and to
receive suggestions and criticisms. Although this proposed committee
has not been formed, several American states have set up similar
bodies.' 8
It is recommended that some such body be instituted in Ontario;
an independent agency to hear all representations on administrative
practice in the province, and to act as a guide to the individual
agencies in the formulation of their rules of procedure. Such an
agency should not be attached to any branch of government but
should be directly responsible to the legislature through the office
of the Attorney-General. Its composition should include not only
lawyers and career civil servants, but also members of the areas of
industry and commerce that are effected by administrative action.
Separation of Adjudication and Prosecution
It is not uncommon to find that in Ontario, as in the United
States, a large number of boards and commissions have concentrated
within them the features of both a judge and prosecutor. Most
characteristic are the licensing and regulating bodies, such as the
Securities Commission and the Liquor Licence Board. These agencies
have combined within themselves what has been described as:
both the power to initiate complaints and the power to determine
whether the alleged facts which give rise to the complaints exist to such
a degree as to justify the imposition of a penalty.,9
Thus, the Securities Commission receives a complaint concerning a
person's activity in the securities field, investigates the complaint
and takes action to suspend the party's licence. It may then hold a
hearing to decide whether the decision at first instance, to suspend
the licence, was proper. Or, again, the Liquor Licence Board will
V7 Report of the Attorney-Genera's Committee on Administrative Pro-
cedure (1941), S. Doc. 8, 77th Cong. 1st Sess.
IsSee Comment on California's '"Division of Administrative Procedure"
by B. Schwartz, supra, footnote 12, Minutes of Evidence, at p. 1027; (1957),
35 Can. Bar Rev. at p. 779; also, Hurwitz, The Danish Parliamentary Com-
missioner for Civil and Military Government Administration, (1958), Journal
of the International Commission vf Jurists: at p. 224.19 Landis, The Administrative Process, (New Raven, Yale University
Press, 1938), at p. 9.
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investigate a licencee's operation, and then has the power to hold a
hearing to determine whether the licencee "is not a fit and proper
person" and thus subject to losing his licence.
When a man sits as a judge in his own cause, as is the case
where a board or commission exercises both prosecutory and adjudi-
catory functions:
the litigant often feels that in the combination of functions within a
single tribunal or agency, he has lost all opportunity to argue his case
to an unbiased official and that he has been deprived of safeguards that
he has been taught to revere.20
In the United States, the A.P.A. has achieved a form of internal
separation of functions by means of the appointment of a group of
semi-independent hearing officers within each agency. Called exam-
iners, their function is purely to hear the case and either make the
final decision, or recommend a decision which is considered best by
the agency.
But, as Prof. B. Schwartz indicates,21 this internal separation, al-
though of value as far as it goes, only deals with problems at the level
of initial or recommended decisions. The crux of the matter lies in the
concentration of functions in the agency itself, and no attempt is
made to deal with that. It is a problem of whether there can be a
practical separation of the prosecutory and adjudicatory functions
when both are subject to one ultimate authority. Salary and tenure
of these officers is still subject to control of the Civil Service Com-
mission, and although the agency itself may not directly control or
influence the position of the examiners, they are still no more than
civil servants liable to be removed by the Commission should it feel
such removal to be expedient.22
Generally, most boards and commissions in Ontario which
exercise licensing or regulatory powers are faced with the problem
of combined functions. However, some of these boards have an effec-
tive internal separation, such as the Liquor Licence Board. This
Board maintains an Inspection Department which visits licensed
premises in the province to ensure that operations are up to Board
standards. Premises not meeting the Board's requirements are
obliged to take corrective action or run the risk of losing the licence.
Such action is taken after a hearing before the three-man Board. In
practice a limited area of discretion is open to abuse in cancellation
of licences. Although the statute itself gives broad grounds for
cancelling a licence, even if for no other reason that the holder, in
the Board's opinion, is not a fit and proper person:
2 o Supra, footnote 17 at p. 204.
21 B. Schwartz, The Administrative Procedure Act (1947), 63 L.Q.R. 43 at
p. 60.
22For a judicial discussion of the position of hearing examiners within
the federal civil service, and, particularly, of the agencies' influence over
them, see Ramspeck et. al. v. Trial Examiners Conference et. al. (1953), 345
U.S. 128 at p. 138.
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the practice of the present Board has been to cancel a licence only when
the holder commits an offence or act that disqualifies him from having
a licence for reasons specifically set out in the Act.23
A situation of greater interfusion of functions is found in the
Ontario Securities Commission. Here, the Chairman is the only full-
time member of the Commission. The Commission receives and
investigates complaints, doing so, it would appear, directly under the
supervision of the Chairman. It is the Chairman that issues the
ex parte order of the Commission suspending or revoking a licence.
However, this initial step of the Commission has been termed
"administrative",2 4 and, as no hearing is required, the ruling of the
Commission may be given ex parte.25
The area of difficulty, however, rests in the exercise of s. 29 of
the Securities Act, under the provisions for review, for here the
full Commission sits. This means that the Chairman who may have
instituted proceedings under s. 21, and later made the order, is now
sitting as a "quasi-judicial" 26 officer on review of his own decision.
To any party appearing before the Board under this section it must
appear that in reality he is appealing only to the other two members
of the Board. The obvious solution to this overlap of the prosecutor
and adjudicator, would be to separate the Chairman, or administra-
tive head, from the three man Commission which acts in an adjudi-
catory capacity. Thus, we could obtain an internal separation of
functions as exists under other boards, where an independent tribunal
can hear both sides of a case argued, not having had any previous
contact with the material before it at an "administrative" level.
The Gordon Committee Report provides some interesting com-
mentary on the organization of the Securities Commission. The
Report emphasized the broad discretion necessary in carrying out
the purely administrative functions of the Commission and says:
The Chairman devotes his full time to the work; the other two
members are called in from time to time when there are important
questions which should be decided by the Commission as a whole.27
It is only to be assumed that this statement refers to other functions
of the Commission, and does not apply to the review provisions of s.
29 of the Act, which requires more than a "time-to-time" meeting of
the three Commissioners.
More disconcerting is the statement found a page later in this
report. It reads:
It is important to the conception of organization just discussed that
the administrative head also serve on the three-man Commission. The
intention is not that doubtful or questionable matters should be taken
out of the administrative machinery, but rather that they should receive
the attention of the three-man Commission in plenary session. Therefore,
23 Supra, footnote 3, at p. 395-6.24 Re The Securities Act and Gardiner et. al., [1948] O.R. 71 at p. 75.
25 The Ontario Securities Commission v. Dobson et. al., [1957] O.W.N.
183 at p. 186.26 Supra, footnote 3, at p. 69.
27 Ibid, p. 69.
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we believe that in the circumstances the present arrangements seem
to create a conflict in the roles assigned to the Chairman, the appropriate
safeguards lie in preserving governmental responsibility and in the
statutory provisions for appeal.2 8
The astonishing nature of this statement lies in the fact that
while the Report does recognize the conflict in the two roles of the
Chairman, it refuses to make any form of recommendation to remedy
the defect. No recommendation is made to implement the general
characteristics of "openness, fairness and impartiality" that the
Committee itself suggests29 must attach to tribunals holding a hear-
ing. Instead, the status quo is maintained. Moreover, this is the
reverse of the attitude found in the recommendations regarding the
Ontario Fuel Board, where the separation of the Board's "adminis-
trative" and "quasi judicial" functions was advised.
30
At some levels' the Government has presently recognized the
need for complete external separation of the conflicting adjudicatory
and prosecutory functions, as is evidenced by two bills recently tabled
in the Ontario Legislature.31 The combined provisions of the Energy
Act and the Energy Board Act implement the recommendations of
the Gordon Committee, and separate the duel functions of the
Ontario Fuel Board, placing investigatory and prosecutory matters
in the hands of the Department of Energy Resources, while the
process of adjudication rests with the newly proposed Energy Board.
The reasons for this legislation were outlined by the Minister of
Energy Resources: C
at the moment the Fuel Board has been both judge and prosecutor.
it has established the terms of reference, the codes, the offences, the
penalties, and has then supervised these codes and has sat in judgment
of any offence. At the same time if has to determine what franchises
should be granted to what municipalities and what companies, as well
as what rates should prevail. Consequently, one day it has been setting
standards and the next day it has been hearing infractions and dealing
with licences.
Sd, the Fuel Board, in fact, has been policeman, prosecutor, judge
and jury.3 2
The 'Minister goes on to say that until now the combination of
functions was not to the detriment of the industry or the consumer,
but at the present time the industry has grown too important to be
left entirely within the jurisdiction of the Fuel Board. The standards
are now to be set by the Department, and inspectors to investigate
and launch prosecutions before the newly proposed Energy Board
will be appointed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council. The Board
appears to be free from governmental interference in all facets of its
operation. It is responsible to the Legislature through the Minister
of Energy Resources, although it is in no way a branch of his depart-
2 8 !bid, p. 70.
29 Supra, footnote 6, para. 23.
30 Supra, footnote 3, at p. 73.
31An Act Establishing the Ontario Energy Board, Bill 38, 1960; The
Energy Act, Bili 39, 1960.
32 The Hon. Robert Macaulay, Debates of the Ontario Legislature, Febru-
ary 8, 1960, p. 196.
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ment. This is a movement in the desired direction, towards effective
and complete separation of functions.
One final comment must be made on a new office created by the
Energy Act - that of the Energy Returns Officer.33 In applications
before the Energy Board the company applying usually has all the
information and knowledge regarding rates and services, but not so
the municipality which has little knowledge of the details of battle.
The Energy Returns Officer is party to every application before the
Board for a rate hearing, and has the duty to bring forward all
pertinent facts surrounding the applications, be they 'in favor of one
side or the other. He is a member of the Department of Energy
Resources, and his duty is to help the Board and other parties before
it.3 His position could be said to be that of an "amicus curiae."
Notice
The purposes of an administrative procedure act is to ensure
fairness to those whose rights are affected by agency action. To
require the specification of issues before any hearing commences is
one of the basic elements of fair procedure. Of what use can the
right to a hearing be, unless those affected are informed beforehand
of the matters 'in issue? Therefore, anyone entitled to a hearing
should be given reasonable notice of the time and place of the hearing,
and the issues involved therein. The notice ought to contain suffi-
cient information to give the party knowledge of the case he has to
meet. It would be desirable if the notice stated the legal authority
under which the hearing is to take place.
The Franks Committee35 recommended that citizens be given
notice in good time of the case they will have to meet, whether the
issue to be heard by the tribunal is one between the citizen and the
administration, or between citizen and citizen. The Committee did
not suggest legal pleadings. Rather, the citizen should receive 'in
good time, beforehand, a document setting out the main points of
the opposing case.
The A.P.A.36 envisages a limited form of pleading. Where a private
person commences proceedings before the tribunal, the opposing
party, or the agency itself, as the case may be, is required to give
prompt notice of issues controverted 'in fact or in law. This is intended
to apprise the initiatng party, of the issues he must sustain. Where
an agency, of its own volition, requires a person to appear before it,
the agency can require that person to file pleadings responding to
the allegations set out in the formal notice.
This form of pleading is designed to accomplish the same result
as that employed in court litigation-the narrowing of the issues and
the consequent avoidance of prolonged proceedings. An innovation
3 3 Op. cit. The Energy Act, Part III s. 21 ff.34 Supra, footnote 32, at p. 198.35 Supra, footnote 6, paragraphs 71 and 72.36 Section 5a A.P.A., 5 U.S.C. c. 19, s. 1004(a).
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of this character in Ontario administrative practice could achieve the
same result.
It is recognized that at the time of the original notice the
agency may not be cognizant of all the possible issues. The section
in the A.P.A. is so framed that the legal and factual issues can be
communicated either by the formal notice initiating proceedings, or
during the hearing itself. In either event, the party affected must
have ample notice of these issues with due time to examine and
prepare for them.
The Model State Act expressly provides for this. Section 8
states:
The notice shall state the time, place and issues involved, but If, by
reason of the nature of the proceeding, the issues cannot be fully stated
in advance of the hearing, or if subsequent amendments of the issues is
necessary, they shall be fully stated as soon as practicable, and op-
portunity shall be afforded all parties to present argument with respect
thereto.
It will be the duty of the court to decide whether the inform-
ation contained in a notice, is sufficient to comply with the Act.
Probably in no case will the notice be as inadequate as in Urban
Housing v. Oxford.37 There, the town clerk sent a letter demanding
that certain walls be torn down by the plaintiff, Within a prescribed
period of time. Inactivity, the plaintiff was warned, would prompt the
clerk to take action to remove them. When the plaintiff failed to
comply with the demand, the town engineers tore down his walls.
It was held that the plaintiff did not receive adequate notice of the
town's intended action. A threat by the town clerk to take action
would convey an impression of legal proceedings, and not the physical
action taken.
The American courts have interpreted their notice section in a
very liberal manner, not requiring the same degree of exactness in
the pleadings as is customary in those of a court of law.
38 It is
recommended that the same policy be applied to a proposed act. If
a party has a clear knowledge of the issues of law and fact involved,
he has no cause for complaint.
37 [1939] 4 All E.R. 211.
38 In Kuhn v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 183 F. 2d. 839 at 842 (D.C. Circ.
1950), a case concerning the sufficiency of an administrative complaint, the
court said, "... if it is clear that the parties understand exactly what the
issues are when the proceedings are had, they cannot thereafter claim sur-
prise or lack of due process because of alleged deficiencies in the language
or particular pleadings." In American Newspaper Publishers Association v.
National Labour Relations Board, 193 F. 2d 782 (7th Circ. 1951), affirmed 345
U.S. 100 (1953), the court held that where an N.L.R.B. complaint failed to
allege which subsection of the Labour Act was violated, or where the com-
plaint alleged the wrong subsection, such failure or mistake, if it did not
mislead the parties, did not prevent the Board from considering and deciding
the charge presented in the complaint. The function of the complaint was to
advise the party of the charge. It need not state a cause of action in the
sense required in an action at law.
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Prehearing Conference
In actual preparation for hearing before a board, the parties
concerned may have very little to go on. For example, in an appeal
from an order of the Ontario Securities Commission under the
Securities Act,39 counsel for a client charged in a Commission discip-
linary proceeding must move not only without the benefit of discovery
but also without the assistance of subpoena. If counsel is allowed to
look at transcripts of investigations he may not keep possession of
them, but must leave them in the custody of the Commission. Even
more fundamental, the appellant does not know what the Securities
Commission's case is, and exactly what he is charged with. He has
no idea what the essential points in issue are.
This brings up the question of examinations for discovery, and,
what the Ameficans call "prehearing conference." Primarily, the
Americans make effective use of the prehearing technique in agency
hearings which are essentially disputes between private parties, but
it is not used so extensively in accusatory proceedings, because of the
principle against self-incrimination. However, where prehearing is
used, it can compensate to a certain extent for the lack of an exami-
nation for discovery procedure in that it eliminates the element of
surprise from the hearing proper. It is conducted in a manner far less
formal than an examination for discovery, and its purpose has been:
to simplify the issues, provide for the exchange of exhibits and fix the
time for such exchange, obtain admissions of facts and of the authenticity
of specified documents, limit the number of expert witnesses, agree upon
matters of which official notice can be taken...40
This narrowing and defining of the issues cannot but be desirable.
In hearings such as those before the Securities Commission, counsel
would have an indication of what the important points at issue were,
and would be able to direct argument to these points spedifically
instead of having to argue every point he can think of, as is the case
at present. Also, effective use of prehearing techniques would cut
down the time for adjournments that are required to deal with these
technical problems.
Prehearing, when used in such matters as contested applications
for permits before the Ontario Energy Board might result in the
parties concerned reaching some degree of agreement and settlement
as to the issues contested, and thus eliminate much of the time that
might otherwise be spent before the Board in argument.
With these considerations in mind, it is recommended that pro-
visions be made for the use of preheafing techniques before boards
and commissions, whether they be boards exercising a prosecutory
39R.S.O. 1950, c. 351, s. 29(1): "Any person or company . . . who is
primarily affected by any such direction, decision, order or ruling may...
request a hearing and review by the Commission of the direction, decision,
order or ruling."
40 Chas. S. Rhyne, Can You Try An Administrative Agency Case As You
Do a Case in Court? (1954), 40 A.B.A.J. 751 at p. 753.
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function, as does the Securities Comnmission, or boards whose duties
are only to weigh interests between private parties. Such prehearing
machinery should be available under all these boards, but activated
only upon the request of one of the parties. Upon request, the order
for prehearing should then be written, as it is in the United States,
by a member of the board, who subsequently conducts the conference,
limiting its scope to those points and matters covered in the order.
While provisions for examination for discovery as known in our civil
courts might tend to formalize board hearings to too great a
degree, 'it is suggested that a prehearing conference would be a more
flexible instrument in achieving the desired elements of familiarity
with the case to be met.
A further point must be made with respect to the availability
of transcripts taken in antecedent proceedings. As has been men-
tioned, counsel before the Ontario Securities Commission do not have
a right to obtain copies of transcripts for their own use, but must
return them to the custody of the Commission. It is imperative that
a person accused or brought into a disciplinary proceeding be entitled
unqualifiedly to have access to evidence raised in an investigation
which will be used against him. If as in the case of the Securities
Commission counsel can examine such material in the chambers
of the Commission, they would seem to be no logical reason why he
should not be able to procure permanent copies of it at his own
expense.
The A.P.A. provides for such guarantees,4 ' parties being entitled
to obtain copies of documents. In the case of non-public investigatory
hearings, the witness or party may for good cause be limited to an
examination of the official transcripts only, especially where the
agency may be planning to launch a later criminal prosecution. But:
parties should, in any case, have copies or an opportunity for inspection
in order to assure that their evidence is correctly set forth, to refresh
their memories in the case of stale proceedings, and to enable them to
be advised by counsel. They should also have such copies whenever
needed in legal administrative proceedings. 42
Subpoenas
In general, those boards and commissions of the Ontario govern-
ment that hold hearings are empowered by their enabling statutes
to summon any person and require him to give evidence on oath.
43
An exception, in some respects, is the Ontario Securities Commission.
4_lSupra, footnote 11, s. 1066 (b).
42 Report of the Committee on the Judiciary (1945), S. Doc. 752, 79th
Cong. 1st Sess., p. 19.
43See: The Ontario Highway Transport Board Act, 1955 (Ont.), c. 54,
s. 8; The Ontario Municipal Board Act, R.S.O. 1950, c. 262, s. 41, provides that
the Board has the powers of the Supreme Court in regard to the attendance
and examination of witnesses, and the production and inspection of docu-
ments; section 11(c) of the Racing Commission Act, R.S.O. 1950, c. 329,
empowers the Commission "... to summon any witness by subpoena.., and
to require such person to give evidence on oath and to produce such docu-
ments and things as the Commissioner deems requisite in any such hearing."
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The Securities Act44 grants the Commission power to subpoena wit-
nesses and documents on an investigation into violations of the Act.
If there is an appeal from the Chairman's ruling to the full Com-
mission, there is no similar power.
This conceivably might result in the Commission having available
on the hearing of an appeal copies of documents obtained during
its investigation, whereas the appellant would be unable to call
witnesses unwilling to testify or produce documents on his behalf.
The Commission could ask a reluctant witness to testify for an appel-
lant who discloses that the former's evidence is very valuable to him.
However, such a demand would not have the force of law behind it,
in the absence of a statutory subpoena power.
To ensure that an individual appearing before a board, has the
same access to subpoenas as that available to the board, a provision
similar to that in the A.P.A. is required. Section 6 (c) of the U.S.
Act states:
Agency subpoenas authorized by law shall be issued to any party upon
request and, as may be required by rules of procedure upon a statement
or showing of general relevance and reasonable scope of the evidence
sought. Upon contest the court shall sustain any such subpoena or similar
process or demand to the extent that it is found to be in accordance with
law, and, in any proceedings for enforcement, shall issue an order
requiring the appearance of the witness or the production of the
evidence or data....
This section only applies to agencies having authority by statute
to issue subpoenas. Thus, if applied to Ontario, the Ontario Securities
Commission, lacking the subpoena power on appeals, would be unalfe
to issue one to the appellant. Therefore, a clause giving particular
tribunals the power of issuing subpoenas would be useful. Such a
provision should encompass the Securities Commission and any other
bodies possessing a great evidence-gathering advantage over the
private party.
The 1955 Hoover Commission Report on administrative proce-
dure at the U.S. federal level, recommended that agencies be
authorized to issue subpoenas for appearance of witnesses or the
production of evidence in proceedings required to be determined after
a hearing. The Commission followed the A.P.A. requirements by
stating that subpoenas be issued impartially on a showing of general
relevance and reasonable scope of the evidence sought.
The person desiring the subpoena has the onus of showing that
the evidence sought is relevant to the 'issues in the hearing. Any
subpoenaed witness should be allowed to move before the agency
that the subpoena be struck out or modified on the grounds that his
evidence is not relevant to the matters in issue.
44 Supra, footnote 39, s. 21(3).
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It is noteworthy that the Franks Comniittee,45 also recommended
that parties in England have the right to apply to the tribunal for a
subpoena.
Legal Representation
It is generally recognized that the right to legal representation
before a tribunal is vital to the just adjudication of a case, and to
the proper elicitation of the facts involved.46 To our knowledge there
is no effective bar to such representation before tribunals in Ontario.
Nonetheless, as a necessary safeguard, it should be entrenched as a
part of administrative procedure.
In England, where tribunals are more numerous than in this
country, and exercise a wider variety of functions, there may be
some qualification to representation before certain boards. In some
cases, representation is only allowed on permission of the tribunal con-
cerned; in other cases it is not allowed at all. The Franks Committee
recommended that such a right be curtailed only in the most
exceptional circumstances, and also, that when a citizen was denied
counsel before a board, the government department appearing against
him should also be so denied.47
The basic arguments in favour of permitting counsel rest on
two considerations. Firsly, in presenting his case, the average man
is unable to distinguish between evidence and argument, and this
results in a less effective delivery of the case.48 Someone of experi-
ence speaking on a party's behalf can do much to present the case
in a more successful manner. Secondly, it is almost impossible for
a layman to cross-examine witnesses effectively. If a right of cross-
examination is given, it follows that a means of its effective imple-
mentation should be given as well.
The right to legal representation should not be limited so as to
qualify only lawyers to appear. As in England, any person capable
of representing a party should be able to appear. Particularly, we
refer to such persons as trade union representatives who are skilled
in presenting workmen's cases before the Labor Relations Board and
the Workmen's Compensation Board.
45 Supra, footnote 6, para. 92 states: "In some cases, an applicant may be
handicapped by the absence of some oral evidence or document, and we
recommend that applicants should have the right to apply to the tribunal in
such cases for a subpoena. The issue of a subpoena should, however, be in
the discretion of the tribunal and under its authority."
46 Robson, Justice and Administrative Law, 3rd ed. (London, Stevens and
Sons Ltd., 1951) at p. 579; supra, footnote 11, paragraphs 83 to 88, and
paragraph 197.
47 Supra, footnote 6, para. 88 and para. 409 No. 15.
48 (1957) 121 J.P. 670, at p. 671.
49 Prof. F. H. Lawson, Submission, Minutes of Evidence, supra, footnote
1, p. 338.
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Evidence
Tribunals are resorted to for their expeditiousness, expertise,
and relatively low cost. These advantages over a court of law are due
in part to their informality. But:
* . . informality without rules of procedure may be positively inimical
to right adjudication, since the proceedings may well assume an un-
ordered character which makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the
tribunal properly to sift the facts and weigh the evidence.50
Therefore, statutory rules of procedure to guide the tribunal 'in
hearing the evidence are required. The most significant problems to
be met by those rules are:
1) On whom lies the burden of proof?
2) Should the Common Law exclusionary rules of evidence be
applied?
3) Should there be full opportunity to answer a case by cross-
examination and rebuttal evidence?
1. Burden of Proof
The person seeking to alter the status quo should open the
hearing and have the burden of proof. Thus, on an application for
a licence, the onus would be on the applicant to demonstrate his
merits to the tVibunal. Where a tribunal conducts a hearing con-
cerning the revocation of a licence, the burden would rest on the
party advancing evidence against the licencee, since the attacker is
seeking to disturb the status quo.
2. Common Law Rules of Evidence
Occasionally, the enabling statute will provide that the Board
is not bound by "the legal or technical rules of evidence". 51 This has
been interpreted in Ontario so as to allow the tribunal to admit
hearsay evidence. 52 However, where a tribunal was expressly freed
by statute from the legal rules of evidence in relation to one of its
functions, it was held that the exclusionary rules applied to its other
functions.53 On the other hand, where the statute had no provision
as to procedure, the admission of hearsay by the Lieutenant-Governor
in Council of British Columbia, was not necessarily incompatible with
the judicial nature of the inquiry.54
These cases illustrate the uncertainty existing in Canada as to
whether tribunals should admit hearsay. The courts have been com-
pelled to deal with each case on its merits, rather than formulating
a general principle. Accordingly, the question proposes itself, should
5 o Supra, footnote 6, para. 64.
51 Securities Act, R.S.O. 1950, c. 351, s. 29(3).
52 Supra, footnote 24.
53 Clarke v. Chutorian and Orloff, [1952] 5 W.W.R. (N.S.) 207.54 Wilson and others v. Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Co., [1922J 1
A.C. 202.
55 For the viewpoint of a writer who advocates its admission, see Profes-
sor Kenneth Culp Davis, Evidence, 30 N.Y.U.L. Rev., p. 1309.
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tribunals be permitted to act on hearsay? Frequently hearsay is the
best evidence available. To refuse to accept it may result in there
being little or no evidence available on an important issue.
Among those who advocate the admission of hearsay, the most
common expression used is "admit it for what it is worth." Some
hearsay is worthless. Yet hearsay is relied on by responsible people
in their everyday affairs and the degree to which a person acts on
hearsay depends on his appraisal of its worth. The Model State
Administrative Act focuses on the reaction of the individual, in
prescribing a test for the admission of evidence. Section 9 (1) states:
Agencies may admit and give probative effect to evidence which pos.
sesses probative value commonly accepted by reasonable prudent men In
the conduct of their affairs... .. They may exclude incompetent, irrelevant,
immaterial, and unduly repetitious evidence. (italics ours.)
If incompetent eVidence means hearsay, then the agency is
given a discretionary power to admit or exclude such evidence.
On this point, Section 7(c) of the A.P.A. provides:
Any evidence, oral or documentary, may be received, but every
agency shall as a matter of policy provide for the exclusion of immaterial
and unduly repetitious evidence and no sanction shall be Imposed or
rule of order be issued, except as supported by relevant, reliable, and
probative evidence....
The words "any evidence" indicate that the common law rules are
not to apply. Hearsay is admissible if it is material. Every decision
is to be based on relevant, reliable, and probative evidence.
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, a leading American writer on
Administrative Law, has suggested in connection with the question
whether a tribunal should admit hearsay that:
Hearsay is sometimes better than no evidence. The reason for the
hearsay rule is that cross-examined evidence is usually better than hear-
say. The hearsay rule fails to take account of circumstances in which
the only choice presented is between making a finding on the basis of
no evidence and appraising particular hearsay so as to give it such
weight as it may deserve. When this is the choice, I think the tribunal
should be allowed to inquire whether the particular hearsay is In the
particular circumstances the kind of evidence on which responsible
persons would rely in serious affairs.5 6
Elsewhere in his article, he points out that the leading scholars on
evidence assert that the jury trial rules are not suited to the adminis-
trative process where the arbiter of facts has special qualifications
for deciding factual questions.
Therefore, subject to certain safeguards, hearsay should be
admissible. The following conditions are designed to prevent an indis-
criminate use of this "legally incompetent" evidence. If followed,
the so-called evils of hearsay will be minimized: 1. the hearsay evi-
561bid, p. 1333.
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dence must be of probative value; 2. hearsay evidence should be
received only if inconvenience or impossibility preclude the presence
of the declarant. The more important the evidence, the greater should
be the degree of inconvenience before hearsay evidence is admitted.
The necessity for this second requirement winl be more apparent
when we discuss the right to cross-examine.
Should a decision based entirely upon hearsay eVidence be
upheld, or should it be necessary that the decision have some "legal"
evidence to support it? This problem remains a great source of con-
tention in American administrative law. The U.S. "Residuum Rule"
was formulated by the New York Court of Appeal in Carroll v.
Knickerbocker Ice Co.57 The court there held that even when an
agency is not bound by the ordinary rules of evidence because of a
statute, there must nevertheless be a residuum of legal evidence to
support the claim before an award can be made; the court can inquire
whether there was sufficient competent evidence to support the
administrative finding.
Decisions can be found in the United States for and against
this doctrine. The A.P.A. and the Model State Act fail to state
whether hearsay evidence alone can support a finding. In Canada a
Crown grant issued to a settler's executor by the Lieutenant-Governor
in Council has been upheld even though the decision to make the
grant was based entirely upon hearsay evidence.58
It is suggested that the cogency of the probative value of the
evidence determines whether hearsay alone can be the basis of a
decision. Where all the circumstances, and the evidence taken
together, inevitably lead to a particular conclusion, then that conclu-
sion should be given effect to even though the evidence on which it
is based is entirely hearsay.59
3. Cross-Examination and Rebuttal Evidence.
Without the right to cross-examine witnesses and to present
rebuttal evidence, there cannot be a real hearing. This was recog-
nized by Lord Loreburn in Board of Education v. Rice, where he
said that the tribunal could
obtain information in any way they think best, always giving a fair
opportunity to those who are parties in the controversy for correcting or
contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial to their view.60
57 218 N.Y. 435, 113 N.E. 507 (1916).
5S Supra, footnote 54.
59 A test enunciated by Judge Learned Hand in NationaZ Labour Rela-
tions Board v. Remington Rand Inc., 94 F. 2d 862, at 873, (2nd Circ. 1938), cer-
tiorari denied, 304 U.S. 576 (1938), has been followed occasionally in the United
States. Dealing with a statute providing that in a proceeding before the
N.L.R.B., the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity should
not be controlling, Judge Hand stated, "that mere rumour will not serve to
'support' a finding, but hearsay may do so, at least if more is not conveniently
available, and if in the end the finding is supported by the kind of evidence
on which responsible persons are accustomed to rely in serious affairs."
60 [1911] A.C. 179, at p. 182.
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Cross-examination, the device employed to check the accuracy
of the Witness' testimony, is a cherished part of our legal process.
It is
the greatest legal engine ever invented for the ascertainment of the
truth.6 1
However, where the Lieutenant-Governor in Council of British
Columbia refused in a proceeding of a judicial character to allow a
party, about to be deprived of his property, to cross-examine or
adduce rebuttal evidence, the Privy Council held there was no failure
of natural justice.62 The decision can be justified only on the basis
that the statute, under which the hearing was held, permitted the
Lieutenant-Governor in Council to find as a question of fact that there
was sufficient evidence whose weight would not be diminished either
by cross-examination or by the production of further evidence in
rebuttal. The Globe Case63 has affirmed the right to cross-examine in
a judicial proceeding. There is no doubt that this right should be in-
cluded in any act on administrative procedure.
The admission of hearsay evidence and the right of cross-
examination may be incompatible. Frequently the hearsay is in the
form of a letter written by an individual who is unable to appear
in person. The opposite party cannot cross-examine a letter. The
introduction of letters and other documents without the presence of
the writer may erode the right of cross-examination. Similarly, a
frequent use of a witness to testify as to what the declarant told
him could have the same effect. The witness can only be cross-
examined on the accuracy of his recollection of what the declarant
told him, and not as to the truth of the facts.
The conflict between hearsay and the right to cross-examine is
demonstrated in Southern Stevedoring Co. v. Voris et al.64 The
Longshoremen's and Harbour Workers' Compensation Act provided
that in conducting a hearing the Deputy Commissioner was not to
be bound by the common law rules of evidence. At the compensation
hearing in question, the issue was the cause of a worker's 'injury.
Letters from two doctors as to the source of his injury were admitted.
Admission of the letters prevented the company from cross-examining
the doctors as to their findings. The two doctors resided in the city
where the hearing took place. The United States 5th Circuit Court
of Appeal upheld the objection of the company and ordered a new
hearing. The court held that even under the liberal provisions of the
Act, it could not sanction what had occurred.
: .the more liberal the practice in admitting testimony, the more
imperative the obligation to preserve the essential rules of evidence by
which rights are asserted or defended.65
61 Wigmore, The Law of Evidence 2nd ed. (Boston, Little, Brown & Co.,
1935) Vol. 1, p. 36.6 2 Supra, footnote 54.
63In re Toronto Newspaper Guild and the Globe Printing Company,
[1951] O.R. 435, [1952] O.R. 345, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 18.
64190 F. 2d 275, (1951).
65Ibid, p. 277.
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The A.P.A. guaranteed the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses.
The Compensation Act's provision
does not, indeed it could not, dispense with a right so fundamental in
Anglo-Saxon Law as the right of cross-examination. 6 6
The company was entitled to ascertain in cross-examination whether
there were any additions or explanatory facts, and to test the knowl-
edge and competence of the witnesses and the basis of their pro-
fessional opinion.
The case does not stand for the proposition that hearsay evidence
should always be excluded. Rather, 'it supports our earlier recom-
mendation that hearsay be admitted only when it is inconvenient
or impossible to have the declarant testify. Since the doctors' evi-
dence was directed to the central issue of the hearing, and since they
resided in the locality, there was no reason to exclude the right of
cross-examination and permit their hearsay. The more important the
evidence, the greater should be the effort to produce the declarant. 67
When the Ontario Municipal Board had the jurisdiction to grant
certificates of public necessity and convenience, after a hearing, to
transport firms and truckers, letters were received from shippers
throughout the province, and other interested parties, reciting their
need for service; although hearsay the letters were admitted in
evidence. It would have been inconvenient for the writers to testify,
and, in any case, their evidence did not carry much weight.68 These
circumstances fulfill the requirement for admitting hearsay. In such
a situation the inability to cross-examine does not work a hardship.
Decision Based On The Transcript
American administrative terminology attaches a wide meaning
to the term "the record"; the Canadian and English practice is to
attach a narrower meaning to the term.69 In terms of Ontario practice,
66 lbid, p. 277.
67The Virginia Statute on Administrative Procedure emphasizes the
desirability of the presence of the declarant or the original document. Va. S.
Code Ann., s. 9-6 11(a) (Supp. 1954) states: "all relevant and material evidence
shall be received, except that: ... (2) hearsay shall be received only if the
declarant is not readily available as a witness; and (3) ... any evidence of
the contents of a document shall be received only if the original is not readily
available. In deciding whether a witness or document is readily available the
agency shall balance the importance of the evidence against the difficulty
of obtaining it, and the more important the evidence is the more effort should
be made to produce the eye-witness or the original document."
68 See: The Law Society of Upper Canada, Special Lectures 1953, Admini-
strative Tribunals (Toronto, Richard de Boo Ltd.), pp. 60-1.
69 On a motion for certiorari, the record is brought up to the High Court,
where the decision is either quashed or upheld. One of the grounds for certio-
rari is an error of law appearing on the face of the record. It is at this
point that the meaning of the word "record" becomes important. The defini-
tion determines where the Court can look to find the error of law. In R. 'v.
Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, Ex Parte Shaw, [1952] 1
K.B. 338, Denning L. J., stated at p. 352, ". .. I think the record must contain
at least the document which initiates the proceedings; the pleadings, if any;
and the adjudication; but not the evidence, nor the reasons, unless the tribu-
nal chooses to incorporate them. If the tribunal does state its reasons, and
those reasons are wrong in law, certiorari lies to quash the decision."
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the record consists of the documents initiating proceedings and the
document recording the decision. The United States concept includes
the entire transcript of the testimony and the exhibits, together
with all papers filed in the proceeding.
The A.P.A. requires that the decision be based on the record.
This assures a party appearing before an agency that the decision
rendered will be based entirely upon the evidence given during the
proceedings. He need not worry that the agency will consider, in
making its order, matters not adduced in evidence during the hearing.
It is suggested that this dedision-reaching process be adapted
to the Ontario scene. The record, as we know it, should be retained
for certiorari purposes, but the transcript of the evidence taken
should form the exclusive basis on which the decision is made. To
ensure "the sanctity of the transcript", the tribunal would be com-
pelled to inform the party of the policy considerations that play a
role in its decision. Once the tribunal's general policy on a particular
topic is made a part of the transcript, the party appearing can point
out how a decision favourable to him will perpetuate that policy.
A New York State administrative expert has emphasized the
exclusiveness of the record. He advocated that nothing be taken into
account by the administrative tribunal in reaching its decision that
was not introduced in some manner into the record of the hearing.7
0
Section 9 (2) of the Model State Administrative Act follows these
dictates:
All evidence, including records and documents in the possession of
the agency of which it desires to avail itself, shall be offered and made
a part of the record in the case and no other factual information or
evidence shall be considered in the determination of the case.
By substituting "transcript" for "record" in this clause, Ontario
could have a requirement of like effect. The underlying motive for
this provision is that the decision should not rest on information
outside the transcript, for this would be information which the
parties have had no opportunity to test for trustworthiness and to
explain or rebut.
Re Fairfield Dairy and The Milk Control Board of Ontario71
affords an illustration of an Ontario court upholding this principle.
At a hearing before the Board, the dairy was charged With supplying
customers who had not paid in advance. This was contrary to the
regulations. The Chairman refused to furnish the names and addresses
of any person so supplied. The dairy argued that a hearing under
the relevant legislation meant one where the dairy charged had an op-
portunity to hear the evidence against it. The court agreed and held
there was no hearing where the evidence in support of the charge is
70Benjamin, Administrative Adjudication in the State of New York, p.
207.
71 [1942] O.W.N. 579.
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not adduced. If the evidence is not revealed, the alleged offender is
incapable of presenting a case in rebuttal.
72
This admrinistrative tenet has prevented an American court from
following the Arlidge case73 in regard to a report which was from a
subordinate hearing officer and was prepared for the benefit of the
agency. Whereas the House of Lords in the Arlidge case held that
non-disclosure of an inspector's report of a local inquiry did not
cause the Local Government Board to violate the rules of natural
justice, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in Mazza v. Cavicchia,74
held that the failure of an agency to reveal a subordinate's report
vitiated the statutory right to a hearing. The New Jersey court felt
that an agency decision based on a secret report violated a private
party's right to have a decision based only upon materials which he
knows about and is given an opportunity to meet; such a report must
be revealed and made part of the record so as to give the party an
opportunity of controverting the findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and recommendations made therein, and only after the report's dis-
closure could the agency use the report as an aid in reaching a
decision.
The hearing by a subordinate officer of the agency, a fundamental
part of English and American administrative practice, is not the
custom in Ontario. Here, the administrative tribunal that makes the
decisions holds the hearing itself. Yet the Mazzo v. Cavicchia case
is important in our jurisdiction because it is based on the principle
against ex parte evidence. This principle was the crux of the decision
in Errington v. The Minister of Health.75 The Minister, after holding
an inquiry, received ex parte statements from one party to the contro-
versy. No opportunity was afforded the plaintiff to contest the evi-
dence adduced in his absence. This was held to be contrary to natural
justice.
The procedure act would require that nothing be used as evidence
unless it formed a part of the transcript. The parties would then be
cognizant of the materials on which the tribunal could base its
decision.
There are some facts that need not be proved. In a court of law,
the judge takes judicial notice of facts that are common knowledge
and indisputable. In the United States, the administrative law
counterpart of judicial notice 'is "official notice." The difference
between the two is that an administrative tribunal, because of its
expertise and research 'in a particular field, has at its command facts
7 2 For other cases on the right of the party to see the evidence that the
tribunal has access to, see: R. v. Archbishop of Canterbury; Ex Parte Morant,
[19441 1 K.B. 282; R. v. Architects' Registration Tribunal, Ex Parte Jagger,
[19451 2 All E.R. 131; Memorial Gardens v. Colwood Cemetery Company,
[1958] S.C.R. 353.
73 [1915] A.C. 120.
74 (1954), 105 A. 2d. 545 (N.J.).
75 [1935] 1 K.B. 249.
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less well known and less undisputed by the community than those
that may be judicially noticed. American courts have permitted
official notice to be taken of information in the agences' files, or
otherwise readily accessible. All facts so noticed are communicated
to the parties, who are afforded an opportunity to refute them and
challenge their veracity. The A.P.A. requires that the agency state
in its decision that it has taken notice of material facts not appearing
on the record. Any party can then contest the facts noticed and
attempt to persuade the agency to reach another conclusion. The
Model Act's provision is probably better in that the agency informs
the parties during the hearing that it is taking notice of certain
technical or scientific facts within its specialized knowledge; the
parties can immediately controvert the facts so noticed.
Length of Proceedings
Frequent adjournments and other time-consuming delays pro-
long proceedings in some cases far beyond the time required to reach
a just decision. A provision to the effect that every tribunal should
proceed with reasonable despatch to conclude any matter presented
to 'it, but that due regard be had for the convenience and necessity
of the parties, is included in the A.P.A. A similar stipulation would
serve as a necessary guide to Ontario administrative tribunals.
Reasoned Decisions
Our final comment on the hearing itself rests on the practice of
tribunals giving reasons for their decisions. There is such a uniform
and widespread support for this practice that we can but repeat what
has been said before.76 Prof. Schwartz comments that
the obligation to give a reasoned decision is a substantial check upon
the misuse of power. The giving of reasons serves both to convince those
subject to decisions that they are not arbitrary, and to insure that they
are not, in fact, arbitrary.77
To this end, the decisions should be based on evidence contained in
the transcript, and not on independent material.
The Gordon Report says that
It is a general presumption that the quality of decisions cannot
but be favourably affected. The practice tends to exert a discipline on
the process by which a decision is reached. And, at the very least, the
decision will be made to appear less arbitrary. Where the policy is not
settled, or must in the nature of things change from time to time, the
existence of a record of reasoned decisions, if regarded as the agency's
jurisprudence, might tend to harass its work. It might be charged with
inconsistency. But where inconsistency is not improper, we would regard
this as a lesser charge than that the agency was wielding its power in
the dark.78
76 Supra, footnote 3, at p. 29; supra, footnote 6, para. 98; supra, footnote
12, Minutes of Evidence, p. 1020, and (1957), 35 Can. Bar Rev. at p. 769.
77Supra, footnote 12, Minutes of Evidence p. 1020, and (1957), 35 Can.
Bar Rev. 767.
78Supra, footnote 3, p. 29.
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The Americans have seen fit to provide a requirement for
reasoned deci§ions.79 And, in line with the comment of the Franks
Committee that it was
convinced that if tribunal proceedings are to be fair to the citizens,
reasons should be given to the fullest practicable extent .... 80
section 12 of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act was passed, and it
provides:
It shall be the duty of the tribunal or Mlinister to furnish a state-
ment, either written or oral, of the reasons for the decision if requested,
on or before the giving or notification of the decision, to state the
reasons.S1
It is our opinion that as reasons are salutory to good decision-
making, they should be given in all instances, whether requested by
the parties or not. Those tribunals not adhering to this practice should
accordingly be compelled to do so.
Rule-Making
Under the American Act a distinction is drawn between the
adjudicatory functions of an agency and its rule-making power.
82
Although comment on rule-making powers is not within the scope
of any recommendations we way have for an administrative proce-
dure act, we nonetheless feel some mention should be made of their
exercise.
Before such power is exercised, there is a desire that there be
some antecedent publicity and consultation with the parties con-
cerned. This was the purpose of section 4 of the American Act,
which required general notice of proposed rule-making to be published
in the Federal Register:
Said notice is to include: (1) a statement of the time, place, and
nature of the rule-making proceedings; (2) reference to the authority
under which the rule is proposed; and (3) either the terms or substance
of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved.
The agency must then afford interested persons the opportunity to parti-
cipate in the rule-making through submission of written data, views, or
arguments, and all relevant matters so presented must be considered by
the agency.8 3
From these requirements are excepted interpretive rules,
general policy statements, and rules of agency organization, proce-
dure, and practice. Under the public rule-making procedures the
agencies must, in addition to publication of notice, confer with in-
dustry advisory committees, consult organizations, hold informal
hearings, and take other similar steps to keep abreast of public
desires.
79 Supra, footnote 11, s. 1006 (d).
80 Supra, footnote 6, para. 98.
81Supra, footnote 9.
82 .Supra, footnote 11, s. 1003, 1958 Code.
83 Supra, footnote 21, p. 48.
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Somewhat similar terms for such prior notice were also found
in the former English Rules Publication Act, 1893,84 which was super-
seded by the Statutory Instruments Act, 1946.85 The 1946 Act
curiously did away with the provisions for prior notice of rule-making.
With the increased scope of government activity and control 'in
the fields of private industry, it becomes more and more desirable
for the industries concerned to have notice of rule-making that will
affect their operation. Parliamentary enactments are subject to public
scrutiny and open debate, and interested parties can make represen-
tations to their members in the legislature. However, the enactment
of broad, general statutes which set no standards, but merely provide
for the Lieutenant-Governor in Council to make regulations
to carry out effectively the intent and purpose of this act86
places an extensive power in the hands of the delegatee drafting the
regulations. We do not suggest that this process was adopted to
facilitate secretive rule-making, but rather to enable a government
department to deal with rule-making matters in a speedy and efficient
manner.
In the absence of any statutory requirements, what is the prac-
tice in Ontario? An example of rule-making procedure may be seen
in the circumstances surrounding the passage of Regulations 36/60
under the Public Commercial Vehicles Act.8 7 Circular notices were
sent out to all interested members of the trucking industry, and their
representatives had several meetings with the Department of Trans-
port in order to discuss and straighten out the details of the proposed
regulation. Although the finished product was not entirely satis-
factory to all parties, at least an opportunity had been provided for
open discussion of the proposals, and the areas of disagreement were
known to all parties concerned.
Some practice, from the point of view of the citizen affected, is
unquestionably laudable. But is it the general practice? Most govern-
ment officials, when approached on this subject, are emphatic that
it is. They say that regulations dealing with the public are made
to cover problems existing outside the government and therefore are
relatively ineffective unless they take full cognizance of the public's
requirements. The officials convey the impression that the practice
of providing for the hearing of the opinion of the public on proposed
rules is a standard, though not formally required, procedure. How-
ever, this is directly contrary to the situation as reported in the
Gordon Report, where the following submission made to the Com-
mittee is reproduced:
8456 and 57 Vict. c. 66.
85 9 and 10 Geo. 6, c. 36.
86 The Tourist Establishments Act, R.S.O. 1950, c. 393, s. 2(1) (p).
87 The Public Commercial Vehicles Act, R.S.O. 1950 c. 304.
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On the other hand, the proceedings through which regulations are
established are not public. Unless the Government makes some pre-
announcement, which is unusual in Ontario, there is no advance knowl-
edge of the contents of regulations prior to their publication in the
Ontario Gazette. As a result, opportunity is not given for public discus-
sion and the presentation of representations by those affected until after
the regulqtions have become law.88
We can only conclude that no matter what the Government may
feel its practice is in this respect, the public concerned is far from
convinced of its adequacy. The recent example set by the Department
of Transport is only a single instance of progressive and responsible
rule-making. Such practice should be all encompassing, and be com-
pulsory for all Government departments, boards, and commissions
faced with the responsibility of making regulations directly affecting
the public.
Any projected Ontario administrative procedure legislation
should contain, as does the United States Act, a section imposing a
duty on these departments to give official notice of their proposed
rule-making activity. Such notice should be printed in the Ontario
Gazette, and should state the times and places where representations
may be made by interested parties. In addition, it would seem desir-
able that letters or circulars be sent out to those members of the
public most directly concerned with the proposed regulations. It is
far more effective to initially draft a regulation that complies as
closely as possible with general requirements than to pass one "ex
parte" and then have to revise it to fit the circumstances as they are
found to exist.
88 Supra, footnote 3, at p. 18.
